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Two Narratives of Platform Capitalism
Frank Pasquale*
I. THE ROLE OF NARRATIVE IN ECONOMIC THOUGHT
Mainstream economists tend to pride themselves on the discipline's resem-
blance to science.! But growing concerns about the reproducibility of economic
research are undermining that source of legitimacy. These concerns have fueled
renewed interest in another aspect of economic thought: its narrative nature.'
When presenting or framing their work, neoliberal economists tend to tell sto-
ries about supply and demand, unintended consequences, and transaction costs
in order to justify certain policy positions. These stories often make sense, and
warn policymakers against simplistic solutionism. For example, in the case of
platform capitalism, a neoliberal economic account tends to praise firms like
Uber, Airbnb, TaskRabbit, and Postmates for promoting labor competition and
improving quality, by telling a simple narrative about the incentives created by
reducing transactions costs and creating more opportunities for individuals and
firms to compete to provide services. This account also emphasizes how easily
* Frank Pasquale is Professor of Law at the University of Maryland. He has served
on the National Science Foundation-sponsored Council on Big Data, Ethics, and
Society, and presently serves on the program committees of the Workshop on Da-
ta and Algorithmic Transparency and the Neural Information Processing Systems'
Symposium on Machine Learning and the Law.
1. See, e.g., David C. Colander, Book Review, 60 S. ECON. J. 767 (1994) (reviewing
ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, ECONOMICS-MATHEMATICAL POLITICS OR SCIENCE OF
DIMINISHING RETURNS? (1992)).
2. See Donald N. McCloskey, Storytelling in Economics, in NARRATIVE IN CULTURE:
THE USES OF STORYTELLING IN THE SCIENCES, PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE 5-22
(Cristopher Nash ed., 1990); see also GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER,
ANIMAL SPIRITS: How HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY AND WHY IT
MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2009); RUSSELL ROBERTS, THE INVISIBLE HEART:
AN ECONOMIC ROMANCE (2001); Daniel Sutter & Rex Pjesky, Where Would Adam
Smith Publish Today?: The Near Absence of Math-free Research in Top Journals, 4
ECON J. WATCH 230 (2007).
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efforts to regulate the terms of such employment may be captured by incum-
bents-an "unintended consequences" story.3
However, as Simon Stern warns, the "satisfaction created by a fitting con-
clusion can beguile us into crediting a story, leading us to accept too readily that
it has achieved its explanatory aims."4 For decades after Russell Hardin crafted a
narrative about the "tragedy of the commons," economists cited it as a rationale
for imposing private property rights. But empirical research revealed "com-
mons" arrangements that did not end tragically.' Legal scholar Carol Rose
countered Hardin with a "comedy of the commons," telling a very different sto-
ry about opportunities for mutual aid and sustainable use of shared resources.6
One may challenge the narratives of conventional, neoliberal economics by
contesting the empirical validity of the factual foundations of its narratives.
Such an empirical approach is one way of pursuing a fruitful hermeneutics of
suspicion. But it is not sufficient to dislodge conventional narratives from the
heuristics so often resorted to by policymakers. Rather, just as it "takes a theory
to beat a theory," a plausible counternarrative is far more likely to displace a
conventional narrative than isolated empirical challenges to the conventional
narrative's factual foundations. This essay develops a counternarrative to domi-
nant approaches to platform capitalism, schematically presented below.
3. ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILITY,
JEOPARDY (1991) (arguing that both perversity and futility are aspects of an unin-
tended consequences narrative); Martha T. McCluskey, How the "Unintended
Consequences" Story Promotes Unjust Intent and Impact, 22 LA RAZA L.J. 21, 22
(2012).
4. Simon Stern, Narrative in the Legal Text: Judicial Opinions and Their Narratives, in
NARRATIVE AND METAPHOR IN LAW 8 (Michael Hanne & Robert Weisberg eds.,
forthcoming 2017) (citing J. David Velleman, Narrative Explanation, 112 PHIL. REV.
1 (2003)).
5. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION (2015).
6. CAROL M. ROSE, The Comedy of the Commons, in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION:
ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 105, 1o6 (1994)
(noting that American "legal doctrine has strongly suggested that some kinds of
properties should not be held exclusively in private hands but instead should be
open to the public or at least subject to the ius publicum, to use the Roman law
terminology the'public right' [of use]").
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Narratives of Platform Capitalism
Conventional Narrative Counternarrative7
Platforms promote fairer labor Platforms entrench existing inequalities
markets by enabling lower-cost entry and promote precarity by reducing the
into these markets by service bargaining power of workers and the
providers. stability of employment.
Platforms reduce the impact of Platforms increase discrimination by
discrimination by increasing the identifying customers with picture-
number of service providers in based profiles which reveal their race or
transportation, housing, and other racially-identified names. Ranking and
markets. rating systems can also reinforce bias.
Regulators of platforms are likely to Large platforms now command so
reflect the biases and interests of many resources that their own lobbying
incumbent providers (like taxis and efforts can easily swamp those of
hotels) thanks to incumbents' political fragmented and uncoordinated
ties. incumbents.
Large digital platforms have gained Large digital platforms have gained
massive market share because of the massive market share because of luck,
quality of their service. first-mover advantage, network effects,
lobbying, strategic lawlessness, and the
unusually low cost of investment capital
due to quantitative easing.
Platforms promote economic growth Platforms undermine growth by
by drawing the un- and under- reducing wages as workers scramble for
employed into the labor market. gigs by offering to complete them for
lower wages than their competitors.
Platforms promote flexibility by Low-pay gigs and piecework force
breaking down jobs into tasks, workers to be "ready for duty"
enabling workers to piece together constantly lest they miss an opportunity
work at their own pace. to work.
Using data-driven profiles of users, Users may experience loss of agency
platforms can preemptively channel when serendipitous or unpredictable
them to the workers they are most options are effectively hidden or
compatible with. obscured.
7. The counternarratives here reflect Michel Foucault's development of the term
"counter-memory" or "counter-history," which contests dominant or received
ideas. Jos6 Medina, Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance, 12 FOUCAULT
STUD. 9, 31 (2011) (noting "the crucial role that counter-memory needs to play to
resist and subvert the epistemic oppression that condemns the lives of marginal-
ized people to silence or oblivion").
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While science aspires to convergence on settled truths and natural laws,
narrative is often plural: there can be more than one side to a story. For positiv-
ists, science is a more solid and reliable form of knowledge (and foundation for
judgment) than storytelling. However, the free will of humans, plasticity of our
institutions, and opacity of our thoughts recurrently frustrate social scientists
who aspire to the type of prediction and control regularly achieved by natural
scientists and engineers in the world of things and non-human animals. If we
are to better understand the most important economic phenomena of our day,
we must reveal the stories about competition, desert, and regulation that both
animate and undermine the models and empirical analyses in mathematicized
and quantitative social science.
II. NEW PLATFORMS, SAME OLD STORIES?
Simple stories distort multifaceted realities-but not necessarily any more
than simple mathematical models do. Moreover, they may well motivate the
economic research they are supposed to merely reflect. As platform capitalism
becomes a more important way of setting wages for various distributed tasks in
online settings, narratives of its impact will play a very important role in areas
ranging from antidiscrimination law, to wage and hours regulation, to labor
law.'
According to some thought leaders in Silicon Valley, global platforms for
labor and services will provide extraordinary opportunities for workers.9 A
"peer economy" of platform-arranged production will break down old hierar-
chies. Gig workers will be able to knit Etsy scarves in the morning, drive Uber
8. Social scientists and theorists have offered pithy definitions of both platform capi-
talism, and platforms generally. See, e.g., Paul N. Edwards, Carl Lagoze, Jean-
Christophe Plantin & Christian Sandvig, Infrastructure Studies Meet Platform Stud-
ies in the Age of Google and Facebook, 1o NEW MEDIA & SOC'Y 1, 7 (2016) (comparing
infrastructure and platforms); Paul Langley & Andrew Leyshon, Platform Capital-
ism: The Intermediation and Capitalization of Digital Economic Circulation, 2 FIN. &
SOc'Y (forthcoming 2016), http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/37514/1/Platform%2o
capitalism%2oFinance%20%26%2oSocietyo/2oPre-Publication%2oVersion.pdf
[http://perma.cc/E6HL-9ZSU] ("To create multi-sided markets and coordinate
network effects, platforms enrol [sic] users through a participatory economic cul-
ture and mobilize code and data analytics to compose immanent infrastructures.
Platform intermediation is also nested in the ex-post construction of a replicable
business model. Prioritizing rapid up-scaling and extracting revenues from circu-
lations and associated data trails, the model performs the structure of venture cap-
ital investment which capitalizes on the potential of platforms to realize monopoly
rents.").
9. See, e.g., Tad Friend, Tomorrow's Advance Man, NEW YORKER (May 18, 2015),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/o5/18/tomorrows-advance-man
[http://perma.cc/8EKT-QH8R]; Nicholas Lemann, The Network Man, NEW
YORKER (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2o15/10/12/the-
network-man [http://perma.cc/3ZX6-GVBQ].
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cars in the afternoon, and write Facebook comments at night, flexibly shifting
between jobs and leisure at will.
But is platform capitalism really a route to opportunity for labor, or just
one more play for capital accumulation in an increasingly stratified economy?"o
A premier platform of digital labor matching-Amazon's Mechanical Turk
(MTurk) `--has permitted purchasers of "human intelligence tasks" to pay al-
most nothing for labor-resulting in effective compensation far lower than the
U.S. minimum wage." Scholars like Trebor Scholz13 and Miriam Cherry 4 have
discussed the sociological and legal implications of platforms that try to dis-
claim responsibility for following labor laws or other regulations. Lilly Irani has
shown just how corrosive platform capitalism has become: "With workers hid-
den in the technology, programmers can treat [workers] like bits of code and
continue to think of themselves as builders, not managers."" The lived experi-
ence of many Uber drivers and "TaskRabbits" shows the downside of disinter-
mediation. Sarah Kessler describes making $1.94 an hour labeling images for a
researcher who put the task for bid on MTurk."6 The median active TaskRabbit
in her neighborhood made $120 a week; Kessler cleared $u an hour on her best
day. 7
io. See Frank Pasquale, Closed-Circuit Economics, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 26, 2010, 11:27
AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/20lo/11/closed-circuit-economics.html [http://
perma.cc/C386-PQY2].
11. AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, http://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome [http://
perma.cc/FFU8-7VAR].
12. See Frank Pasquale, Banana Republic.com, JOTWELL (Jan. 14, 2011), http://cyber
.jotwell.com/banana-republic-com/ [http://perma.cc/T59X-8YFB] (reviewing Jon-
athan Zittrain, Ubiquitous Human Computing, 366 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL
SOC'Y 3813 (2008)).
13. See Trebor Scholz, Platform Cooperativism vs. the Sharing Economy, MEDIUM (Dec.
5, 2014), http://medium.com/@trebors/platform-cooperativism-vs-the-sharing-
economy-2ea737fib5ad [http://perma.cc/XUL9-E7AR].
14. Miriam A. Cherry, A Taxonomy of Virtual Work, 45 GA. L. REV. 951 (2011).
15. See Lilly Irani, Justice for "Data Janitors," PUB. BOOKS (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www
.publicbooks.org/nonfiction/justice-for-data-janitors [http://perma.cc/6RVB-
6LHL].
16. Sarah Kessler, Pixeled & Dimed: On (Not) Getting By in the Gig Economy, FAST
COMPANY (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.fastcompany.com/3027355/pixel-and-
dimed-on-not-getting-by-in-the-gig-economy [http://perma.cc/J7M8-JQXP].
17. Id.; see also Antonio Casilli, Is There a Global Digital Labor Culture?: Marginaliza-
tion of Work, Global Inequalities, and Coloniality 1 (Oct. 25, 2016) (unpublished),
http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-o1387649/document [http://perma.cc/
UM62-BKSF] (discussing "the extent to which this vast click farm economy predi-
cated on value and data transfer from the Global South to the North can be con-
strued as a 'neocolonial' system").
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Buoyed by skeptical journalistic accounts of platforms and sociological in-
vestigations, a progressive counternarrative of platform capitalism is emerging:
a deregulated gig economy is a glidepath to precarity, prone to condemn labor-
ers to insecure and poorly paid conditions." This second, darker narrative of
platform capitalism balances the sunny optimism of neoliberals.' 9 It also in-
creasingly informs the commentary of experts on law and technology, like Su-
san Crawford. Her powerful book Captive Audience chronicled the failures of
American broadband policy and proposed compelling solutions.2 0 Her core
message was that large telecommunication firms were not fulfilling their social
obligations as utilities.2 1 She holds new digital platforms to a similar standard,
focusing on Uber.22 Crawford worries that Uber will rapidly monopolize urban
ride services while avoiding regulation and taxes. Though it may offer a good
deal to many drivers and riders now, there is no guarantee it will in the future.
As Crawford argues, "When it comes to city-wide transport and communica-
tions networks, serving everyone at a high basic level fairly-including driv-
ers-is more important than permitting a single company to make enormous
profits from a substitute basic private service."2 3 There is no assurance that "the
market" will guarantee such results.
Tom Slee shares Crawford's concerns, focusing on room-letting apps. 4 He
also condemns the digital colonization of international housing markets by U.S.
firms: "For a smallish city in Canada, what happens to accountability when
faced with a massive American company with little interest in Canadian em-
ployment law or Canadian traditions?" Slee's question raises a deep point about
18. OURS To HACK AND To OWN: THE RISE OF PLATFORM COOPERATIVISM, A NEW
VISION FOR THE FUTURE OF WORK AND A FAIRER INTERNET (Trebor Scholz & Nathan
Schneider eds., 2016) (collecting essays critiquing platform capitalism and propos-
ing alternatives).
19. Alex Rosenblat & Luke Stark, Uber's Drivers: Information Asymmetries and Control
in Dynamic Work, io INT'L J. COMM. 3758 (2016).
20. See SUSAN CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE AUDIENCE: THE TELECOM INDUSTRY AND
MONOPOLY POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2014).
21. Id.
22. Susan Crawford, Getting over Uber, BACKCHANNEL (Oct. 16, 2015), http://back
channel.com/getting-over-uber-fdf7sfaf7f6e#.kvfvxjf8 [http://perma.cc/VV7A-
KZYA]. For more work holding powerful digital companies to the standards im-
posed historically on public accommodations, see Aaron Belzer & Nancy Leong,
The New Public Accommodations, 105 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2017); Frank Pasqua-
le, Internet Nondiscrimination Principles, 20o8 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 263, 267 (discussing
the "normative appeal of a common commercial ethic for dominant platforms
online").
23. Crawford, supra note 22.
24. See TOM SLEE, WHAT'S YOURS IS MINE: AGAINST THE SHARING ECONOMY (2016).
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the nature of governance. 5 What happens to a city when its government's re-
sponsibilities are slowly and functionally disaggregated? Some citizens may
want to see the effective governance of paid rides via Uber, of spare rooms via
Airbnb, and so on. A full privatization6 of city governance awaits, from water2 7
to sidewalks.
For partisans of the sharing economy, the shift from territorial governance
(by elected representatives) to functional governance (by firms) will result in a
dynamic mix of corporate semi-sovereigns, all jostling to better serve the pro-
ducers and consumers" on each side of their platforms. But that narrative is
undermined by consolidation of digital platforms. A pattern familiar in online
platforms (where Google/YouTube dominates search in the United States, Bai-
du does so in China; Facebook and its subsidiaries are preeminent in social in
the United States, etc.) is replayed in the dominance of commercial apps for re-
al-space transactions like Uber and AirBnB in the United States, and Didi and
WeChat in China. 2I
The centripetal pull of producers and consumers, and of users and adver-
tisers, toward dominant platforms raises a fundamental question for progres-
sives who want to counter the standard, upbeat neoliberal narrative about the
rise of platform capitalism: should authorities facilitate competition in these
fields? Some believe that, despite all the concentration presently prevailing,
these spaces could become truly competitive over time. That Jeffersonian vision
of decentralized economic power would counsel a greater reliance on antitrust
law in the future.3 0 By contrast, others believe that trends toward monopoliza-
25. Tom Slee, Uber: (Getting Over)A3, MEDIUM (Oct. 18, 2015), http://medium.com/
@whimsley/uber-getting-over-3-e593ade95398#.ch7zu4qy6 [http://perma.cc/VLX5-
HXAA].
26. Jathan Sadowski & Karen Gregory, Is Uber's Ultimate Goal the Privatisation of City
Governance?, GUARDIAN (Sept. 15, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2015/sep/15/is-ubers-ultimate-goal-the-privatisation-of-city-governance [http://
perma.cc/KH4D-UMWJ].
27. See John Vidal, Water Privatization: A Worldwide Failure, GUARDIAN (Jan. 30,
2015), http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/an/3o/water-
privatisation-worldwide-failure-lagos-world-bank [http://perma.cc/6RNC-
2WYZ].
28. See Leo Mirani, The Secret to the Uber Economy Is Wealth Inequality, QUARTZ (Dec.
16, 2014), http://qz.com/312537/the-secret-to-the-uber-economy-is-wealth
-inequality/ [http://perma.cc/49Q6-HA6R].
29. Didi recently purchased Uber China. See Jon Russell, Confirmed: Didi Buys Uber
China in a Bid for Profit, Will Keep Uber Brand, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 1, 2016),
http://techcrunch.com/2o16/o8/ol/didi-chuxing-confirms-it-is-buying-ubers
-business-in-china! [http://perma.cc/ELL9-HFR5].
30. See BARRY LYNN, CORNERED: THE NEW MONOPOLY CAPITALISM AND THE
ECONOMICS OF DESTRUCTION (2010); Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Pow-
er and Inequality: The Antitrust Counterrevolution and Its Discontents, 11 HARV. L. &
POL'Y REv. (forthcoming 2016); Matthew Stoller, How Democrats Killed Their Pop-
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tion are even more powerful in the digital economy than they have been in
"brick-and-mortar" industries. 31 On this view, government should recognize
the likely persistence of duopolists or monopolists and regulate them like utili-
ties.32
Should policy focus on encouraging competition or regulation? The two
approaches are not mutually exclusive-many forms of regulation could assure
a fairer playing field for competition. However, the standard neoliberal narra-
tive of competition presumes that deregulation is a linchpin of truly open and
contestable markets. These clashing visions of a just social order need to be clar-
ified and sharpened in political debate and qualitative social science-not dis-
solved into technocratic cost-benefit analyses. A one-size-fits-all model of plat-
form capitalism cannot do justice to local norms, values, and cultures.33
A recurring narrative in the technology trade press is that dominant plat-
forms prevail thanks to their own merits: they are either the best coded, the best
designed, or the best marketed. But as the sage in Ecclesiastes put it, "The race is
not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong . . . Luck plays a significant role in
business. The first platform to gain critical mass can leverage that advantage in-
to massive financing, which in turn can scare away competitors. Matters are
particularly dire in two-sided markets like search or ridesharing, where con-
sumers are often in a rush and do not care to learn multiple user interfaces in
order to find the best deal among multiple providers.35
If ridesharing or other platforms really are contestable, other purveyors of
connectivity should be able to break into the market-or even redefine the
ulist Soul, ATLANTIC (Oct. 24, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
206/1/how-democrats-killed-their-populist-soul/504710/ [http://perma.cc/77VY-
BFHP].
31. See, e.g., FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK Box SOCIETY 81-82 (2015) (describing trends
toward concentration in digital markets).
32. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Dominant Search Engines: An Essential Cultural & Political
Facility, in THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE 408 (Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus eds.,
2010) ("Antitrust's summum bonum is the maximization of consumer welfare, and
this measure of efficiency is notoriously narrow. For example, the DOJ was hard
pressed to adequately factor in a basic democratic commitment to diverse com-
municative channels during many media mergers. Given antitrust doctrine's pro-
nounced tendency to suppress or elide the cultural and political consequences of
concentrated corporate power, [antitrust authorities] are ill-equipped to respond
to the most compelling issues raised by search engines.").
33. See Duncan Middleton, What's the Problem with Uber?, BBC (Oct. 6, 2015), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/34453025/whats-the-problem-with-uber [http://
perma.cc/N2ZU-28DL] ("Uber services are being banned in Berlin, New Delhi,
Seoul, Madrid and Rio de Janeiro.").
34. Ecclesiastes 9:11.
35. Adam Candeub, Behavioral Economics, Internet Search, and Antitrust, 9 I/S: J.L. &
POL'Y FOR INFO. SoC'Y 407 (2014).
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space as a public utility. That, at least, is the hope of many innovators and activ-
ists who are part of the Platform Cooperativism movement. According to its co-
convener, Trebor Scholz, "An app with the basic functionality of UberX can be
duplicated and improved upon by independent developers who are working in
tandem with cooperatives. From the very beginning, the development process
would have to be steered by workers and developers." 6 In other words, the
choice does not need to be between ossified, old-fashioned taxi and hotel ser-
vices, or gleaming new Silicon Valley monopolies. The best aspects of old and
new consumption and labor models could be combined, given the plasticity of
technology and ubiquity of connectivity.
As the technological reorganization of lodging, transit, and other vital ser-
vices accelerates, the platform cooperativists offer a hopeful message. Even if
governance disaggregates, from territorial to functional logics, we can still cre-
ate communities of concern and vectors of competition. If platform coopera-
tives can balance those two imperatives-promoting more streamlined services
while respecting fair labor practices and community norms and obligations-
they may well be able to succeed. But they are only likely to provide a real and
enduring alternative to the current, compromised giants of platform capitalism
if governments give them some initial breathing room (as infant industries),
and promote a level playing field over time.
Is that a wise policy? Among technocrats, we can only answer that question
with cost-benefit analyses and economic modeling. But behind the economic
models lie narratives about desert (dominant firms either did or did not win
their position on account of their own merits), fair competition (which is either
eroded or enabled b regulation), and the weight of stakeholder interests (cur-
rent consumers' interests trump others, or must be balanced with the interests
of future consumers, producers, and others affected by externalities from the
platform). The neoliberal narrative of platform competition lionizes currently
dominant firms, looks with suspicion on virtually all regulation of them, and
gives current consumer interests far more weight than those of other stakehold-
ers. A progressive counternarrative of platform capitalism is more skeptical of
currently dominant firms, promotes regulation as a necessary limit upon their
power, and balances the interests of current consumers with those of future
consumers (who may want the option of choosing small players who would be
driven into oblivion by the current monopolist without state intervention),
workers, and others.3 7
36. Trebor Sholz, Platform Cooperativism vs. the Sharing Economy, MEDIUM (Dec. 5,
2014), http://medium.com/@trebors/platform-cooperativism-vs-the-sharing-
economy-2ea737flb5ad#.fu8p6k8iz [http://perma.cc/FB9N-2EL3].
37. In the case of roomletting, other stakeholders include local governments (reliant
on hotel taxes), neighbors of roomletters, and tenants in need of long-term hous-
ing. In the case of ride services, traffic, pollution, insurance, and tax considerations
are on the regulatory agenda.
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III. THE STAKES OF NARRATIVE ACCOUNTS
These rival narratives of platform capitalism clarify the stakes of research
into the history of now-dominant platforms and of current rhetoric surround-
ing their rise. The more abusive practices are uncovered at digital giants, the less
they look like virtuous firms that ascended on the basis of merit, and the more
they appear as brigands in need of serious (if belated) discipline. Here, legal in-
vestigations (like the European Union's inquiries into Google's business prac-
tices) are a necessary complement to the reporting of a trade press all too fre-
quently beholden to tech ads (and ad tech) for its very existence.
Like the trade press' reporting, empirical economic research is often ad-
duced to support neoliberal narratives of platform capitalism. Empirical studies
are supposed to clarify matters, but the sociology of knowledge teaches that the
nature and purpose of research often hinges on its funding.38 Legal scholars and
policy experts should be skeptical about the neoliberal narratives of platform
capitalism now emerging out of economic research that may well have been
premised on the very ideas it is now used to validate.
As ways of connecting the past to the future, each narrative has different
strengths. The progressive narrative is more inclusive, taking into account a
longer period of time, and a larger set of social concerns. The neoliberal narra-
tive offers the virtue of simplicity and concision: once we accept a few premises
(regarding the merit of incumbents) and narrow the range of inquiry (to cur-
rent consumer welfare), it is much easier to trivialize or ignore broader social
issues. Well-rehearsed concerns about institutional capacity, regulatory capture,
parsimony in explanation, and predictability are frequently wheeled out to de-
fend neoliberal narratives. But in narrative as in life, the easier route is not al-
ways the wiser one.
John Maynard Keynes once claimed that "[p]ractical men who believe
themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the
slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the
air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years
back." 9 In our time, these invisibly influential "economists and scribblers" are
predominantly neoliberal. Progressives do well to organize workers, launch
campaigns of regulation, and demand transparency from the kingpins of plat-
form capitalism. But to achieve the lasting cultural, political, and economic in-
fluence of neoliberals, they must ensure these isolated actions both arise out of
and reinforce a compelling narrative about the nature of economic progress and
the just distribution of its rewards. Lawyers, sociologists, philosophers, and oth-
er scholars of society have just as much to offer to this narrative as economists.
38. PHILIP MIROWSKI, NEVER LET A SERIOUS CRISIS Go TO WASTE: How NEOLIBERALISM
SURVIVED THE FINANCIAL MELTDOwN 44 (2014) (describing funding for neoliberal
economic research).
39. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND
MONEY 241 (1936).
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Purely numerical measures of income or productivity only tell part of the
story of platform capitalism; indeed, some outside observers worry they may be
manipulated by authorities and count as "productivity" the predictable results
of social ills. In response to such worries, the social sciences and humanities are
helpful guides, painting pictures of alternative futures. They try to explain
events as a text to be clarified, debated, and argued about. They do not aspire to
model our understanding of people on our understanding of atoms or mole-
cules; nor do they promise the false precision of numerical estimates of well-
being. These human sciences are not natural sciences, but are just as valid gen-
erators of knowledge and insight. They deserve a place in any plausible narra-
tive of platform capitalism to come.
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